### Minutes of the OC Executive Board (U) 5 September 1978

(C) The following members were present:

25X1A 25X1A AGENDA ITEM #3: Failure Analysis Briefing

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I. (C) to present the briefing. provided the introduction and conclusion and assisted with presentation of the body of the briefing.

- (C) Except for eight to ten<u>stations</u> in all overseas stations and bases are connected to either directly or indirectly. The failure analysis was conducted to cover contingencies for failure of key lines or power and disasters resulting from fire, wind, explosion, or other calamitous events. Systems failure analysis included the two most vulnerable, MAX and SKYLINK, and proceeded from selected partial failures to total loss of all capability. The conclusion was that we could probably survive loss of any one system until restoral could be effected, but that total loss would result in severe problems.
- (C) In the event of loss of MAX-III circuits with the Pentagon, DOS and Andrews could be reestablished with WASHMAX (MAX-II). Fifty-two field circuits could be transferred into MAX-II. Circuits within the areas would be routed to MAX-II as follows:

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## **Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

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SUBJECT: Minutes of OC Executive Board - 5 September 1978

this effort and it should include use of available capabilities as well as covering what we should add to establish a viable emergency alternate.

AGENDA ITEM #1: Authority to Initiate SKYLINK Secure Voice Calls

1. (C) to lead off. stated that we have a formal mechanism for releasing capies but that no such mechanism exists for initiation of SKYLINK secure voice calls. We do not necessarily need such a mechanism, but we should take a look as to whether we should have one.

2. (O commented that most calls are being placed by officials at very senior levels.

119 calls were placed. The sked what had become of the document on who is authorized to make calls. The commented that no known abuse had been noted on the system, but that the operator had turned down two requests on the basis that the subject matter was personal. After considerable discussion on the need/desirability of establishing controls, it was the general consensus that the present level of use provides no serious problems and that this use serves a purpose, in that it exercises the system. The asked the secretary to locate any documentation on restricting use of the system so that it could be rescinded. Suggested an item in the Newsletter pointing out that use of Skilink secure voice is to be limited to official subject matter and that no command decisions are to be communicated by secure voice.

Footnote: (C) A search of OC and Agency Notices, Regulations, Orders, etc. revealed no document restricting use of SKYLINK secure voice. A member of the team of four individuals tasked with making recommendations for control of use of SKYLINK secure voice recalled that the team's findings and recommendations had been stopped by then Deputy Chief of Operations and that nothing had been published on the subject.

secretary

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APPROVED:

9-20-18 Date

Director of Communications

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